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Abstract
In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information.
There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the
game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given the possibility to
guess the missing information. We show that these games have a value which can be
characterized as a viscosity solution to a fully non-linear variational PDE. Furthermore
we derive a dual representation of the value function in terms of a minimization proce-
dure. This representation allows under some additional assumptions to determine optimal
strategies for the informed player.
Keywords. Dynkin Games, Dynamic Programming, Viscosity Solutions, Incomplete Informa-
tion
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a Dynkin game with incomplete information. The game starts at
time 0 and ends at time T paying off a certain terminal payoff. In between the players can
choose to stop the game and recieve a certain payment dependent on who stopped the game
first. However with regard to the payoffs stopping might be less favourable for them than
waiting for the other one to stop the game or the game to terminate. We assume that the
game is played by two players. One player is informed about the payoffs, while the other one
only knows them with a certain probability (pi)i∈{1,...,I}. Furthermore we assume that the
players observe each other during the game so the uninformed player will try to guess his
missing information.
Games with this kind of information incompleteness have been introduced by Aumann and
Maschler (see [2]) in discrete time setting. Differential games and stochastic differential games
with incomplete information in their spirit have been considered in Cardaliaguet and Rainer
[8], who give a characterization of the value function in terms of a fully non linear partial
differential equation. As in the case of stochastic differential games with incomplete infor-
mation studied by Cardaliaguet and Rainer [8], we allow the players to use an additional
randomization device. We note that randomized stopping times have already been used in
Touzi and Vieille [25] and Laraki and Solan [20] in a different context. As a result even if
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the informed player knows the exact state of nature he might not stop when it is optimal to
stop for him in order to preserve his information advantage.
It turns out that as in the discrete time setting of Aumann and Maschler the randomization
device can be interpreted as a certain minimal martingale with a state space in the proba-
bility measures on {1, . . . I}. With the optimal measure this representation then allows to
determine optimal strategies for the informed agent. This result has been generalized to dif-
ferential games by Cardaliaguet and Rainer in [7] and to stochastic differential games by the
author in [16]. A similar technique of minimization over martingale measures is introduced
in De Meyer [11] to determine optimal strategies for informed agents in a financial market.
In this paper we extend the previous results to the framework of Dynkin games. We show
that the value function of Dynkin games with information incompleteness exists and is deter-
mined by a solution to a fully non-linear second order variational partial differential equation.
We use the latter characterization in order to establish a dual representation of the value via
a minimization procedure over some martingale measures. This representation then allows -
under some additional assumptions - to derive optimal strategies for the informed player.
Dynkin games were introduced by E. Dynkin in [12] as a gametheoretical version of an opti-
mal stopping problem. Ever since there has been a vast variety of results obtained by using
analytical or purely probabilistic tools. As we are considering continuous time Dynkin games
with a diffusion as underlying dynamic we would notably like to mention the works of Ben-
soussan and Friedman [3] and Friedman [15] who were the first to connect Dynkin games to
solutions of second order variational partial differential equations. For for a probabilistic ap-
proach we refer to Alario-Nazaret, Lepeltier and Marchal [1], Bismut [4], Ekstro¨m and Peskir
[13], Eckstro¨m and Villeneuve [14], Lepeltier and Maingueneau [22], Morimoto [23], Stettner
[24] and the recent work of Kobylanski, Quenez et de Campagnolle [19]. In combination with
controlled diffusions also BSDE methods were applied by Cvitanic and Karatzas [10] and
Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [18]. Though the extension of the current paper to Dynkin games,
where also the drift of the diffusion is controlled, might seem rather straight forward there
are some subtleties to consider. Especially when generalizing the BSDE approach of [16] to
an approach with reflected BSDE we have to take into account that for the well-posedness
of reflected BSDE as in Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [18] or Hamade`ne and Hassani [17] one
basically needs that p is continuous. This however implies a severe restriction on the set of
martingale measures P(t, p), making it impossible to just follow the proofs in [16].
Of course our way to consider information incompleteness is rather specific and far from being
the only way to model Dynkin games with incomplete information. A very interesting paper
with a completely different ansatz is the recent work of Lempa and Matoma¨ki [21].
2 Description of the game
2.1 Canonical setup and standing assumptions
Let C([0, T ];Rd) be the set of continuous functions from R to Rd, which are constant on
(−∞, 0] and on [T,+∞). We denote by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) the coordinate mapping on
C([0, T ];Rd) and define H = (Hs) as the filtration generated by s 7→ Bs. We denote Ht,s
the σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in C([t, T ];Rd). Furthermore we provide
C([0, T ];Rd) with the Wiener measure P0 on (Hs) and we consider the respective filtration
augmented by P0 nullsets without changing the notation.
In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ 0
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with terminal time T . The dynamic is given by an uncontrolled diffusion on (C([0, T ];Rd),
(Ht,s)s∈[t,T ],H,P0), i.e. for t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd
dXt,xs = b(s,X
t,x
s )ds + a(s,X
t,x
s )dBs X
t,x
t = x. (1)
Let I ∈ N∗ and ∆(I) denote the simplex of RI . The objective to optimize is characterized by
(i) terminal payoffs: (gi)i∈{1,...,I} : R
d → R,
(ii) early execution payoffs for Player 2: (fi)i∈{1,...,I} : [0, T ] × Rd → R,
(iii) early execution payoffs for Player 1: (hi)i∈{1,...,I} : [0, T ] × Rd → R,
which are chosen with probability p = (pi)i∈{1,...,I} ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. Player 1
chooses τ ∈ [0, T ] to minimize, Player 2 chooses σ ∈ [0, T ] to maximize the expected payoff:
Ji(t, x, τ, σ) = E
[
fi(σ,X
t,x
σ )1σ<τ,σ<T + hi(τ,X
t,x
τ )1τ≤σ,τ<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1σ=τ=T
]
. (2)
We assume that both players observe their opponents control. However Player 1 knows
which payoff he minimizes, Player 2 just knows the respective probabilities pi for scenario
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption (A)
(i) b : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x). For
1 ≤ k, l ≤ d the function σk,l : [0, T ] × Rd → R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous
with respect to (t, x).
(ii) (gi)i∈{1,...,I} : R
d → R, (fi)i∈{1,...,I} : [0, T ]× Rd → R and (hi)i∈{1,...,I} : [0, T ]×Rd → R
are bounded and Lipschitz continuous. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd we have
that
fi(t, x) ≤ hi(t, x) (3)
and
fi(T, x) ≤ gi(x) ≤ hi(T, x). (4)
Remark 2.1. Note that (A) (ii) implies: for all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I)
〈p, f(t, x)〉 ≤ 〈p, h(t, x)〉 (5)
and
〈p, f(T, x)〉 ≤ 〈p, g(x)〉 ≤ 〈p, h(T, x)〉. (6)
2.2 Random stopping times
In Dynkin games both players have the possibility to stop the game with undergoing a certain
punishment (early execution payment), so strategies in this case consist of a stopping decision.
Definition 2.2. At time t ∈ [0, T ] an admissible stopping time for either player for the game
terminating at time T is a (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ] stopping time with values in [t, T ]. We denote the
set of admissible stopping times by T (t, T ). In the following we shall omit T in the notation
whenever it is obvious.
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As in [20], [25] we allow the players to choose their stopping decision randomly
Definition 2.3. A randomized stopping time after time t ∈ [0, T ] is a measurable function
µ : [0, 1] × C([t, T ];Rd)→ [t, T ] such that for all r ∈ [0, 1]
τ r(ω) := µ(r, ω) ∈ T (t).
We denote the set of randomized stopping times by T r(t).
For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I), µ = (µi)i∈{1,...,I} ∈ (T r(t))I , ν ∈ T r(t) we set for
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
Ji(t, x, µi, ν) = EP0⊗λ⊗λ
[
fi(ν,X
t,x
ν )1ν<µi,ν<T
+hi(µi,X
t,x
µi )1µi≤ν,µi<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1µi=ν=T
]
,
(7)
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. (In the following we will skip the subscript
P0 ⊗ λ⊗ λ.) Furthermore we set
J(t, x, p, µ, ν) =
I∑
i=1
piJi(t, x, µi, ν). (8)
We note that the information advantage of Player 1 is reflected in (2.8) by having the possi-
bility to choose a randomized stopping time µi for each state of nature i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
2.3 An example
To illustrate the importance of not immediately revealing the information advantage we would
like to conclude this section with a basic deterministic example. Assume that the game takes
place between times t = 0 and T = 1. There are two possible states of nature i = 1, 2 picked
with probability (p, 1 − p) before the game starts. They are associated to the two payoff
functionals
J1(τ, σ) = (2τ + 1)1τ<σ,τ<1 + (2σ − 1)1σ≤τ,σ<1 + 2 1σ=τ=1 (9)
and
J2(τ, σ) = (3− τ)1τ<σ,τ<1 + (2− σ)1σ≤τ,σ<1 + 3
2
1σ=τ=1. (10)
Player 1, who is informed about the actual state of nature, chooses τ ∈ [0, 1] to minimize
and Player 2 chooses σ ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the payoff functional. However Player 2 is not
informed whether it is J1 or J2 he has to optimize.
Now if the informed player plays a revealing strategy: he immediately stops the game i.e.
τ = 0, if i = 1 is picked, and the payoff is J1(0, σ) = 1. In case i = 2 he does not stop, i.e.
τ = 1, for i = 2. Player 2 does not know i a priori, but if he sees that the revealing Player 1
does not stop he can be sure i = 2, hence the information advantage is lost. In this case it is
optimal for Player 2 to stop immediately which yields the payoff J2(τ, 0) = 2. So the overall
payoff for a revealing strategy of Player 1 would be pJ1(0, σ) + (1− p)J2(τ, 0) = 2− p.
On the other hand if Player 1 plays non-revealing, that means acting as if he does not know
i, both player face a stopping game with payoff
((3− 2p) + (3p − 1)τ)1τ<σ,τ<1 + ((2− 3p) + (3p− 1)σ)1σ≤τ,σ<1
+(32 +
1
2p) 1σ=τ=1,
(11)
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where only p ∈ [0, 1] is known to both players. For p < 17 the uninformed player in his turn will
stop immediately. Hence in this case, we have an overall payoff of pJ1(τ, 0)+(1−p)J2(τ, 0) =
2 − 3p, which is indeed smaller than the revealing case. As we see later in section 6.3. in
general a mixing of randomly revealing and non-revealing strategies will be optimal for the
informed player.
3 Value of the game
For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I) we define the lower value function by
V −(t, x, p) = sup
ν∈T r(t)
inf
µ∈(T r(t))I
J(t, x, p, µ, ν) (12)
and the upper value function by
V +(t, x, p) = inf
µ∈(T r(t))I
sup
ν∈T r(t)
J(t, x, p, µ, ν). (13)
Remark 3.1. It is well known (e.g. [8] Lemma 3.1) that it suffices for the uninformed player
to use admissible non-random strategies in (3.2). So we can use the easier expression
V +(t, x, p) = inf
µ∈(T r(t))I
sup
σ∈T (t)
J(t, x, p, µ, σ). (14)
To show that the game has a value we establish:
Theorem 3.2. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I) the value of the game is given by
V (t, x, p) := V +(t, x, p) = V −(t, x, p). (15)
Remark 3.3. Note that by definition V +(t, x, p) ≥ V −(t, x, p).
To establish V +(t, x, p) ≤ V −(t, x, p) we will show that V + is a viscosity subsolution and
V − a viscosity supersolution to a nonlinear obstacle problem. More precisely we define
the differential operator L[w](t, x, p) := 12tr(aa∗(t, x)D2xw(t, x, p)) + b(t, x)Dxw(t, x, p) and
consider
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
w − 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)}
= 0
(16)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i=1,...,I pigi(x), where for all p ∈ ∆(I), A ∈ SI (where
SI denotes the set of symmetric I × I matrices)
λmin(p,A) := min
z∈T∆(I)(p)\{0}
〈Az, z〉
|z|2 .
and T∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to ∆(I) at p, i.e. T∆(I)(p) = ∪λ>0(∆(I)− p)/λ.
Remark 3.4. Note that since by (2.5), (2.6) the obstacles are separated, we one can consider
as in the classical case (3.5) as
max
{
min{max{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − 〈h(t, x), p〉},
w − 〈f(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)}
= 0.
(17)
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Definition 3.5. A function w : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R is a viscosity subsolution to (3.5) if and
only if for all (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )×Rd×Int(∆(I)) and any test function φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R
such that w − φ has a (strict) maximum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with w(t¯, x¯, p¯) − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 we have,
that
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
φ− 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)}
≤ 0
at (t¯, x¯, p¯). This is equivalent to:
(i) λmin
(
p, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)
≥ 0
(ii) w(t¯, x¯, p¯) = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉
(iii) If w(t¯, x¯, p¯) = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) > 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉, then ( ∂
∂t
+ L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) ≥ 0.
Definition 3.6. A function w : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R is a viscosity supersolution to (3.5) if
and only if for all (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )×Rd×∆(I) and any test function φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R
such that w − φ has a (strict) minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with w(t¯, x¯, p¯) − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 we have,
that
max
{
min{max{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
φ− 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)}
≥ 0
at (t¯, x¯, p¯). This is equivalent to: if
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0,
we have, that
(i) w(t¯, x¯, p¯) = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≥ 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉
(ii) If w(t¯, x¯, p¯) = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) < 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉, then ( ∂
∂t
+ L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ 0.
An essential part of the proof of Theorem 3.2. is given by the following comparison result.
We postpone the proof to the appendix.
Theorem 3.7. Let w1 : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R be a bounded, continuous viscosity subsolution
to (3.5), which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p, and w2 : [0, T ]×Rd ×∆(I)→ R be a
bounded, continuous viscosity supersolution to (3.5), which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous
in p. Assume that
w1(T, x, p) ≤ w2(T, x, p) (18)
for all x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I). Then
w1(t, x, p) ≤ w2(t, x, p) (19)
for all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I).
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4 Dynamic programming
4.1 Regularity properties
Proposition 4.1. V +(t, x, p) and V −(t, x, p) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and p
and Ho¨lder continuous in t.
Proof: The proof of the Lipschitz continuity in x and p is straightforward and omitted
here. For the Ho¨lder continuity in time let t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] with t ≤ t′. Assume V +(t, x, p) >
V +(t′, x, p). Then
0 < V +(t, x, p)− V +(t′, x, p)
= infµ∈(T r(t))I supν∈T r(t) J(t, x, p, µ, ν) − infµ∈(T r(t′))I supν∈T r(t′) J(t′, x, p, µ, ν).
Now for ǫ > 0 choose µ¯ ∈ (T r(t′))I ǫ-optimal for V +(t′, x, p). Since t ≤ t′ we have µ¯ ∈
(T r(t))I . Furthermore choose ν¯ ∈ T r(t) ǫ-optimal for supν∈T r(t) J(t, x, p, µ¯, ν) and define
νˆ ∈ T r(t′)
νˆ =
{
t′ on {ν¯ < t′}
ν¯ on {ν¯ ≥ t′}. (20)
Then we have
V +(t, x, p)− V +(t′, x, p)− 2ǫ ≤ J(t, x, p, µ¯, ν¯)− J(t′, x, p, µ¯, νˆ). (21)
Since
J(t, x, p, µ¯, ν¯)− J(t′, x, p, µ¯, νˆ)
= E[(fi(ν¯,X
t,x
ν¯ )− fi(t′, x))1ν¯<t′ ]
+E
[
fi(ν¯,X
t,x
ν¯ )− fi(ν¯,Xt
′,x
ν¯ )1t′≤ν¯<µ¯i,ν¯<T + hi(µ¯i,X
t,x
µ¯i
)− hi(µ¯i,Xt
′,x
µ¯i
)1t′≤µ¯i≤ν¯,µ¯i<T
+(gi(X
t,x
T )− gi(Xt
′,x
T ))1µ¯i=ν¯=T
]
,
the claim follows with assumption (A) by standard estimates, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily
small. The case V +(t, x, p) < V +(t′, x, p) follows by similar arguments.
The following is a key property in games with incomplete information (see [2]). Our proof
follows closely [8].
Proposition 4.2. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd V +(t, x, p) and V −(t, x, p) are convex in p.
Proof: That V −(t, x, p) is convex in p can be easily seen by the following reformulation
V −(t, x, p) = supν∈T r(t) infµ∈(T r(t))I J(t, x, p, µ, ν)
= supν∈T r(t)
∑
pi infµ∈T r(t) Ji(t, x, p, µ, ν).
(22)
To show that V +(t, x, p) is convex in p: fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and let p, p1, p2 ∈ ∆(I),
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that p = λp1 + (1− λ)p2.
Furthermore choose µ1 ∈ (T r(t))I , µ2 ∈ (T r(t))I ǫ-optimal for V +(t, x, p1), V +(t, x, p2)
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respectively. Then as in [8] Proposition 2.1. one can construct a µˆ ∈ (T r(t))I , such that for
any ν ∈ T r(t) we have that
I∑
i=1
piJi(t, x, µˆi, ν) = λ
I∑
i=1
p1i Ji(t, x, µ
1
i , ν) + (1− λ)
I∑
i=1
p2iJi(t, x, µ
2
i , ν). (23)
Maximizing over ν ∈ T r(t) (4.4) yields then
V +(t, x, p) ≤ λV +(t, x, p1) + (1− λ)V +(t, x, p2) + 2ǫ
and the result follows since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Furthermore from the very definition of V +, V − we have the following:
Proposition 4.3. For all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) we have that
〈f(t, x), p〉 ≤ V +(t, x, p) ≤ 〈h(t, x), p〉 (24)
and
〈f(t, x), p〉 ≤ V −(t, x, p) ≤ 〈h(t, x), p〉. (25)
4.2 Subdynamic programming principle for V +
Theorem 4.4. Let (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I). Then for any t ∈ [t¯, T ]
V +(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ infτ∈T (t¯,t) supσ∈T (t¯,t) E
[〈
p¯, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )1σ<τ,σ<t
〉
+
〈
p¯, h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )1τ≤σ,τ<t
〉
+ V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1τ=σ=t
]
.
(26)
Proof: Fix (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I). Let Aj be a partition of Rd with diam(Aj) ≤ δ for
a δ > 0. For any j ∈ N, choose a yj ∈ Aj and µj ∈ (T r(t))I ǫ-optimal for V +(t, yj, p¯).
Furthermore choose µ¯ ∈ (T r(t¯, t))I to be ǫ optimal for
infµ∈(T r(t¯))I supσ∈T (t¯)
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
ν )1ν<µi,ν<t + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µi )1µi≤ν,µi<t
+V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1µi=ν=t
]
.
(27)
We shall build with µ¯ and (µj)j∈N a randomized stopping time µˆ ∈ (T r(t¯))I in the following
way
µˆ =
{
µ¯ on {µ¯ < t}
(µj)j∈N on {µ¯ = t,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Aj}.
(28)
First note that for any σ ∈ T (t¯).
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
σ )1σ<µˆi,σ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µi )1µˆi≤σ,µˆi<T + gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1µˆi=σ=T
]
=
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
σ )1σ<µˆi,σ<t + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µˆi
)1µˆi≤σ,µˆi<t
]
+
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
σ )1t≤σ<µˆi,σ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µˆi
)1t≤µˆi≤σ,µˆi<T
+gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1µˆi=σ=T
]
,
(29)
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while by the uniform Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients by (A) and of V + by Proposition
4.1. we have for a generic constant c > 0
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
σ )1t≤σ<µˆi ,σ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µi )1t≤µˆi≤σ,µˆi<T + gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1µˆi=σ=T
]
≤∑j∈N∑Ii=1 p¯iE
[
(fi(X
t,yj
σ )1t≤σ<µˆi ,σ<T + hi(X
t,yj
µi )1t≤µˆi≤σ,µˆi<T
+gi(X
t,yj
T )1µˆi=σ=T )1X t¯,x¯t ∈Aj
]
+ cδ
≤ E
[
V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1µˆi≥t,σ≥t
]
+ cδ + ǫ.
(30)
Hence combining (4.8) with (4.10) and (4.11) and choosing σˆ ∈ T (t¯) to be ǫ-optimal for
V +(t¯, x¯, p¯) (3.3) we get
V +(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ infµ∈(T r(t¯,t))I supσ∈T (t¯,t)
∑I
i=1 p¯iE
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
σ )1σ<µi,σ<t + hi(X
t¯,x¯
µ )1µi≤σ,µˆi<t
+V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1µi=σ=t
]
+ cδ + 2ǫ
≤ infτ∈T (t¯,t) supσ∈T (t¯,t) E
[
〈p¯, f(X t¯,x¯σ )1σ<τ,σ<t + h(X t¯,x¯τ )1τ≤σ,τ<t〉
+V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1τ=σ=t
]
+ cδ + 2ǫ.
The claim follows since ǫ and δ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
In contrast to the subdynamic programming for V + a superdynamic programming princi-
ple for V − can not be derived directly. As in [8] we are led to consider the convex conjugate.
4.3 Convex conjugate of V − and implications
For V − : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R we define the convex conjugate (V −)∗ : [0, T ]×Rd×RI → R
as
(V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) = sup
p∈∆(I)
{〈pˆ, p〉 − V −(t, x, p)}. (31)
Let φ : [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) → R such that V − − φ has a strict global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈
[0, T )× Rd ×∆(I) with V −(t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 and
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0. (32)
Then by [6] there exists a δ, η > 0 such that for all p ∈ ∆(I), (t, x) ∈ [t¯, t¯+ η]×Bη(x¯)
V −(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯), p− p¯〉+ δ|p − p¯|2. (33)
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Consequently, for any pˆ ∈ RI
(V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) = supp∈∆(I){〈pˆ, p〉 − V −(t, x, p)}
≤ −φ(t, x, p¯) + supp∈∆(I){〈pˆ, p〉 − 〈∂φ∂p (t, x, p¯), p − p¯〉+ δ|p − p¯|2}
≤ −φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈pˆ, p¯〉+ 14δ |∂φ∂p (t, x, p¯)− pˆ|2,
(34)
which implies by choosing pˆ = ∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯)
(V −)∗(t, x, ∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯)) ≤ −φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯), p¯〉
and for (t, x) = (t¯, x¯) with (4.15)
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, ∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯)) = −V (t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p¯〉
= −φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p¯〉. (35)
Note that (4.15) and (4.16) imply in particular:
Lemma 4.5. If there is a test function φ : [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) → R such that V − − φ has a
strict global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ (0, T )× Rd ×∆(I) with V −(t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 and
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0, (36)
then ∂(V
−)∗
∂p
exists at (t¯, x¯, pˆ) and is equal to p¯.
4.4 Subdynamic programming principle for (V −)∗
Instead of a superdynamic programming principle for V − we can with regard to (4.16) show
a subdynamic programming principle for (V −)∗. To that end the following reformulation of
(V −)∗ will be useful.
Proposition 4.6. For any (t, x, pˆ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × RI we have that
(V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) = infν∈T r(t) supµ∈T r(t)maxi∈{1,...,I} {pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, ν)} . (37)
We recall:
Ji(t, x, µ, ν) = E
[
fi(ν,X
t,x
ν )1ν<µ,ν<T + hi(µ,X
t,x
µ )1µ≤ν,µ<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1µ=ν=T
]
.
Remark 4.7. Again as in Remark 2.1. we can rewrite (4.18) as
(V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) = infν∈T r(t) supτ∈T (t)maxi∈{1,...,I} {pˆi − Ji(t, x, τ, ν)} . (38)
Proof: Denote w(t, x, pˆ) the right hand side of (4.18). Since V − is convex in p we have that
((V −)∗)∗ = V −. Hence it suffices to prove w∗ = V −.
First we show convexity of w in pˆ. To that end let pˆ, pˆ1, pˆ2 ∈ RI , λ ∈ (0, 1) such that pˆ =
λpˆ1 + (1− λ)pˆ2. Choose νˆ1, νˆ2 ǫ-optimal for w(t, x, pˆ1), w(t, x, pˆ2) respectively. Furthermore
define as in [8] a νˆ ∈ T r(t) such that for all µ ∈ T r(t)
Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ) = λJi(t, x, µ, νˆ
1) + (1− λ)Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ2). (39)
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Then for all µ ∈ T r(t)
maxi∈{1,...,I} {pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ)}
= maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
λ(pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ1)) + (1− λ)(pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ2))
}
≤ λmaxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ1)
}
+ (1− λ)maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − Ji(t, x, µ, νˆ2)
}
≤ λw(t, x, pˆ1) + (1− λ)w(t, x, pˆ2).
The convexity follows then by choosing µˆ ǫ-optimal for w(t, x, pˆ).
Next we calculate w∗. By definition of the convex conjugate we have
w∗(t, x, p)
= suppˆ∈RI
{
〈pˆ, p〉+ supν∈T r(t) infµ∈T r(t)minj∈{1,...,I} {Jj(t, x, µ, ν)− pˆj}
}
= supν∈T r(t) suppˆ∈RI
{∑I
i=1 piminj∈{1,...,I} infµ∈T r(t) {Jj(t, x, µ, ν) + pˆi − pˆj}
}
,
where the supremum is attained for pˆj = infµ∈T r(t) Jj(t, x, µ, ν). Hence
w∗(t, x, p) = sup
ν∈T r(t)
{
I∑
i=1
pi inf
µ∈T r(t)
Ji(t, x, µ, ν)
}
= sup
ν∈T r(t)
inf
µ∈(T r(t))I
I∑
i=1
piJi(t, x, µ, ν).
As a direct consequence of (4.18) we have:
Proposition 4.8. For any (t, x, pˆ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × RI we have that
maxi∈{1,...,I} {pˆi − hi(x)} ≤ (V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) ≤ maxi∈{1,...,I} {pˆi − fi(x)} . (40)
Furthermore we have with (4.18) as in Proposition 4.1.:
Proposition 4.9. (V −)∗(t, x, pˆ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and pˆ and Ho¨lder
continuous in t.
Now we can establish a subdynamic programming principle.
Theorem 4.10. Let (t¯, x¯, pˆ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × RI . Then for all t ∈ [t¯, T ]
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ)
≤ infσ∈T (t¯,t) supτ∈T (t¯,t) E
[
maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − fi(X t¯,x¯ν )}1σ<τ,σ<t
+maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(X t¯,x¯τ )}1τ≤σ,τ<t + (V −)∗(t,X t¯,x¯t , pˆ)1τ=σ=t
]
.
(41)
Proof: Fix (t¯, x¯, pˆ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I). Let Aj be a partition of Rd with diam(Aj) ≤ δ
for a δ > 0. For any j ∈ N, choose a yj ∈ Aj and νj ∈ T r(t) ǫ-optimal for (V −)∗(t, yj , pˆ).
Furthermore fix some σ¯ ∈ T (t¯, t) ǫ-optimal for the right hand side of (4.22).
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We shall build with σ¯ and (νj)j∈N a randomized stopping time νˆ ∈ T r(t¯) in the following
way:
νˆ =
{
ν¯ on {ν¯ < t}
(νj)j∈N on {ν¯ = t,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Aj}.
(42)
First note that for any τ ∈ T (t¯)
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − E
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
νˆ )1νˆ<τ,νˆ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
τ )1τ≤νˆ,τ<T + gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1τ=νˆ=T
]}
= maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − E
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
νˆ )1νˆ<τ,νˆ<t + hi(X
t¯,x¯
τ )1τ≤νˆ,τ<t
]
−E
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
νˆ )1t≤νˆ<τ,νˆ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
τ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T + gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1τ=νˆ=T
]}
≤ maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
E
[
(pˆi − fi(X t¯,x¯νˆ ))1νˆ<τ,νˆ<t + (pˆi − hi(X t¯,x¯τ ))1τ≤νˆ ,τ<t
]}
+maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
E
[
pˆi1t≤τ,t≤νˆ − fi(X t¯,x¯νˆ )1t≤νˆ<µˆ,νˆ<T
−hi(X t¯,x¯τ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T − gi(X t¯,x¯T )1τ=νˆ=T
]}
.
(43)
Furthermore by the uniform Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients by (A) we have for a
generic constant c > 0∣∣∣∣E
[
fi(X
t¯,x¯
νˆ )1t≤νˆ<τ,νˆ<T + hi(X
t¯,x¯
τ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T + gi(X
t¯,x¯
T )1τ=νˆ=T
]
−∑j∈NE
[
fi(X
t,yj
νˆ )1t≤νˆ<τ,νˆ<T + hi(X
t,yj
µ˜ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T + gi(X
t,yj
T )1τ=νˆ=T 1X t¯,x¯t ∈Aj
]∣∣∣∣
≤ cδ.
And since v 7→ maxi∈{1,...,I} vi is convex, we have by taking conditional expectation, the fact
that X t¯,x¯ is Markovian and the choice of νˆ in (4.24)
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
E
[
pˆi1τ≥t,νˆ≥t − fi(X t¯,x¯νˆ )1t≤νˆ<τ,νˆ<T
−hi(X t¯,x¯τ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T − gi(X t¯,x¯T )1τ=νˆ=T
]}
≤∑j∈N E
[
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − E
[
fi(X
t,yj
νj
)1νj<τ,νj<T + hi(X
t,yj
τ )1τ≤νj ,τ<T
+gi(X
t,yj
T )1τ=νj=T
]}
1
X
t¯,x¯
t ∈A
j1τ≥t,νˆ≥t
]
+ cδ
≤∑j∈N E
[
(V −)∗(t, yj , pˆ)1
X
t¯,x¯
t ∈A
j1τ≥t,νˆ≥t
]
+ cδ + ǫ,
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which yields with the Lipschitz property of (V −)∗ in x by Proposition 4.6.
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
E
[
pˆi1τ≥t,νˆ≥t − fi(X t¯,x¯νˆ )1t≤νˆ<τ,νˆ<T
−hi(X t¯,x¯µ˜ )1t≤τ≤νˆ,τ<T − gi(X t¯,x¯T )1τ=νˆ=T
]}
≤ E
[
(V −)∗(t,X t¯,x¯t , pˆ)1τ≥t,νˆ≥t
]
+ 2cδ + ǫ.
(44)
Let τˆ ∈ T (t¯) be ǫ-optimal for (V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) (4.18) then combining (4.24) with (4.25) we get
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
E
[
(pˆi − fi(X t¯,x¯νˆ ))1νˆ<τˆ ,νˆ<t + (pˆi − hi(X t¯,x¯τˆ ))1τˆ≤νˆ,τ<t
+(V −)∗(t,X t¯,x¯t , pˆ)1τˆ≥t,νˆ≥t
]}
+ ǫ+ 2cδ.
≤ infσ∈T (t¯,t) supτ∈T (t¯,t) E
[
maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − fi(X t¯,x¯σ )}1σ<τ,σ<t
+maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(X t¯,x¯τ )}1τ≤σ,τ<t + (V −)∗(t,X t¯,x¯t , pˆ)1σ=τ=t
]
+2ǫ+ 2cδ.
The claim follows since ǫ and δ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
5 Viscosity solution property
5.1 Subsolution property for V +
Theorem 5.1. V + is a viscosity subsolution to (3.5).
Proof: Let (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )×Rd× Int(∆(I)) and φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R a test function
such that V + − φ has a strict global maximum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with V +(t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0.
Because of the convexity of V + by Proposition 4.2. and since p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)) we have
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
≥ 0. (45)
So it remains to show
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)(φ), φ − 〈f(t, x), p〉}, φ − 〈h(t, x), p〉} ≤ 0 (46)
at (t¯, x¯, p¯).
Note that by Proposition 4.3. we already have
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 ≤ 0. (47)
So it remains to show that for V +(t¯, x¯, p¯) − 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) − 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 > 0 we
have that (−∂φ
∂t
− L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ 0, which is just a classical consequence of the subdynamic
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programming principle for V +. Indeed if we set τ = t in the dynamic programming (4.22)
we have for an ǫ(t− t¯) optimal σǫ ∈ T (t¯)
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = V +(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ E
[
〈p¯, f(X t¯,x¯σǫ )〉1σǫ<t + V +(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1σǫ=t
]
− ǫ(t− t¯)
≤ E
[
〈p¯, f(X t¯,x¯σǫ )〉1σǫ<t + φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1σǫ=t
]
− ǫ(t− t¯).
(48)
If we now assume
V +(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 > 0 (49)
and
(−∂φ
∂t
− L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) > 0, (50)
then there exists h, δ > 0 such that for all (s, x) ∈ [t¯, t¯+ h]×Bh(x¯)
φ(s, x, p¯)− 〈f(s, x), p¯〉 ≥ δ and (−∂φ
∂t
− L)[φ](s, x, p¯) ≥ δ.
Define A := {infs∈[t¯,t] |X t¯,x¯s − x¯| > h} and note that there exists a constant c depending only
on the parameters of X t¯.x¯ such that P[A] ≤ c(t−t¯)2
h4
. By the Itoˆ formula we have since the
coefficients φ and all its derivatives are bounded
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = E
[
φ(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ , p¯) +
∫ σǫ
t¯
(− ∂
∂t
− L)(s,X t¯,x¯s , p¯)ds
]
≥ E
[
1Ac
(
φ(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ , p¯) +
∫ σǫ
t¯
(− ∂
∂t
− L)(s,X t¯,x¯s , p¯)ds
)]
− c (t−t¯)2
h4
≥ E
[
1Ac
(
(〈f(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ ), p¯〉+ δ)1σǫ<t + φ(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ , p¯)1σǫ=t
+δ(σǫ − t¯)
)]
− c (t−t¯)2
h4
≥ E
[
〈f(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ ), p¯〉1σǫ<t + φ(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ , p¯)1σǫ=t
]
+δE [1σǫ<t + (σ
ǫ − t¯)]− 2c (t−t¯)2
h4
.
Furthermore note that for 1 ≥ (t− t¯) we have that
E [1σǫ<t + (σ
ǫ − t¯)] = E [(1 + σǫ − t¯)1σǫ<t + (t− t¯)1σǫ=t] ≥ (t− t¯). (51)
So
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≥ E
[
〈f(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ ), p¯〉1σǫ<t + φ(σǫ,X t¯,x¯σǫ , p¯)1σǫ=t
]
+δ(t− t¯)− 2c (t−t¯)2
h4
,
which gives with (5.4)
δ(t− t¯)− 2c(t − t¯)
2
h4
− ǫ(t¯− t) ≤ 0.
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Hence
δ − 2c(t− t¯)
h4
− ǫ ≤ 0, (52)
which yields a contradiction, since (t− t¯) and ǫ can be choosen arbitrarily small.
5.2 Supersolution property of V −
With the subdynamic programming principle for (V −)∗ Theorem 4.10. and the estimate in
Proposition 4.9. we can now as in Theorem 5.1. establish:
Theorem 5.2. (V −)∗ is convex and is a viscosity subsolution to the obstacle problem
max
{
min
{
(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w −maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(x)}
}
,
w −maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − fi(x)}
}
= 0
(53)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) = maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − gi(x)}.
We are now using Theorem 4.2 to conclude the supersolution property for V −.
Theorem 5.3. V − is a viscosity supersolution to (3.5).
Proof: Assume that p = ei for an i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, where ei denotes the i-th coordinate vector
in RI . Then (5.9) reduces to the PDE for a game with complete information, i.e.
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − fi(t, x)}, w − hi(t, x)} = 0 (54)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) = gi(x) and the result is standard.
Let p¯ 6∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I} and φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R such that V −−φ has a strict global
minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )× Rd ×∆(I) with V −(t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0. We have to show
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ− 〈f(t, x), p〉},
φ− 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)} ≥ 0 (55)
at (t¯, x¯, p¯). If
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
≤ 0
at (t¯, x¯, p¯) (5.11) obviously holds. So assume
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
> 0. (56)
Note that by Proposition 4.3. we have that V +(t¯, x¯, p¯)−〈f(t¯, x¯), p〉 = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)−〈f(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 ≥
0. So to show (5.11) it remains to show, that for φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) < 〈h(t, x), p〉, we have that
(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) ≥ 0. (57)
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Recall that (5.12) implies by Lemma 4.5. that (V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) is differentiable at pˆ := ∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯)
with a derivative equal to ∂(V
−)∗(t¯,x¯,pˆ)
∂pˆ
= p¯.
From Proposition 4.8. we have
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) ≥ maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(t¯, x¯)}. (58)
Indeed we have strict inequality in (5.14) for p¯ 6∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I}. Assume that
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) = maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(t¯, x¯)}. (59)
Since maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi−hi(t¯, x¯)} is convex in pˆ, we would have that maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi−hi(t¯, x¯)}
is also differentiable at pˆ with a derivative equal to ∂(V
−)∗(t¯,x¯,pˆ)
∂pˆ
= p¯.
However the map pˆ′ → maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆ′i − hi(t¯, x¯)} is only differentiable at points for which
there is a unique i0 ∈ {1, . . . , I} such that maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆ′i − hi(t¯, x¯)} = pˆ′i0 − hi0(t¯, x¯) and in
this case its derivative is given by ei0 . This is impossible since p¯ 6= ei0 . Therefore
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) > maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(t¯, x¯)} (60)
holds, which implies with (4.16)
V −(t¯, x¯, p¯) < 〈pˆ, p¯〉 −maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(t¯, x¯)}
= 〈pˆ, p¯〉+mini∈{1,...,I}{−pˆi + hi(t¯, x¯)}
≤ 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉.
(61)
If we now recall the dynamic programming for (V −)∗ with setting σ = t, i.e.
(V −)∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ) ≤ supτ∈T (t¯,t) E
[
maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − hi(X t¯,x¯τ )}1τ<t
+(V −)∗(t,X t¯,x¯t , pˆ)1τ=t
]
,
(62)
we have with the upper bound of (V −)∗ (5.16) that (V −)∗ has the viscosity subsolution
property to
(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w] = 0 (63)
at (t¯, x¯, pˆ). And as in [6] V − has the viscosity supersolution property to (5.19) at (t¯, x¯, p¯),
hence (5.13) holds.
5.3 Viscosity solution property of the value function
To establish Theorem 3.2. it remains with Remark 3.3. to show that V − ≥ V +. This is how-
ever a direct consequence of Theorem 5.1. and Theorem 5.2. together with the comparison
Theorem 3.7.. We then have the following characterization of the value.
Corollary 5.4. The value function V : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R is the unique viscosity solution
to (3.5) in the class of bounded, uniformly continuous functions, which are uniformly Lipschitz
continuous in p.
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6 Alternative representation
In a second part we use the PDE characterization to establish a representation of the value
function via a minimization procedure over certain martingale measures. To do so we en-
large the canonical Wiener space to a space which carries besides a Brownain motion B a
new dynamic p. We use this additional dynamic to model the incorporation of the private
information into the game. More precisely we model the probability in which scenario the
game is played in according to the information of the uninformed Player 2.
6.1 Enlargement of the canonical space
To that end let us denote by D([0, T ];∆(I)) the set of ca`dla`g functions from R to ∆(I),
which are constant on (−∞, 0) and on [T,+∞). We denote by ps(ωp) = ωp(s) the coordinate
mapping on D([0, T ];∆(I)) and by G = (Gs) the filtration generated by s 7→ ps. Furthermore
we recall that C([0, T ];Rd) denotes the set of continuous functions from R to Rd, which are
constant on (−∞, 0] and on [T,+∞). We denote by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) the coordinate mapping
on C([0, T ];Rd) and by H = (Hs) the filtration generated by s 7→ Bs. We equip the prod-
uct space Ω := D([0, T ];∆(I)) × C([0, T ];Rd) with the right-continuous filtration F , where
Ft = ∩s>tF0t with (F0s ) = (Gs) ⊗ (Hs). In the following we shall, whenever we work under
a fixed probability P on Ω, complete the filtration F with P-nullsets without changing the
notation.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T we denote Ωt = D([t, T ];∆(I)) × C([t, T ];Rd) and Ft,s the (right-continuous)
σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s ≥ t in Ωt. Furthermore we define the space
Ωt,s = D([t, s];∆(I)) × C([t, s];Rd)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . If r ∈ (t, T ] and ω ∈ Ωt then let
ω1 = 1[−∞,r)ω ω2 = 1[r,+∞](ω − ωr−)
and denote πω = (ω1, ω2). The map π : Ωt → Ωt,r × Ωr induces the identification Ωt =
Ωt,r × Ωr moreover ω = π−1(ω1, ω2), where the inverse is defined in an evident way.
For any measure P on Ω, we denote by EP[·] the expectation with respect to P. We equip Ω
with a certain class of measures.
Definition 6.1. Given p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ], we denote by P(t, p) the set of probability
measures P on Ω such that, under P
(i) p is a martingale, such that ps = p ∀s < t, ps ∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I} ∀s ≥ T P-a.s., where
ei denotes the i-th coordinate vector in R
I , and pT is independent of (Bs)s∈(−∞,T ],
(ii) (Bs)s∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion.
Comment 6.2. Assumption (ii) is naturally given by the Brownian structure of the game. As-
sumption (i) is motivated as follows. Before the game starts the information of the uninformed
player is just the initial distribution p. The martingale property, implying pt = EP[pT |Ft], is
due to the best guess of the uninformed player about the scenario he is in. Finally, at the end
of the game the information is revealed hence pT ∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I} and since the scenario
is picked before the game starts the outcome pT is independent of the Brownian motion.
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6.2 Auxiliary games and representation
From now on we will consider stopping times on the enlarged space Ω = D([0, T ];∆(I)) ×
C([0, T ];Rd) .
Definition 6.3. At time t ∈ [0, T ] an admissible stopping time for either player is a (Fs)s∈[t,T ]
stopping time with values in [t, T ]. We denote the set of admissible stopping times by T¯ (t, T ).
In the following we shall omit T in the notation whenever it is obvious.
We note that in contrast to Definition 2.2. the admissible stopping times at time t might
now also depend on the paths of the Brownian motion before time t.
One can now consider a stopping game with this additional dynamic, namely with a payoff
given by
J(t, x, τ, σ,P)t− := EP
[
〈pσ, f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ,σ<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<T
+〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft−
]
,
(64)
where τ ∈ T¯ (t) denotes the stopping time choosen by Player 1, who minimizes, and σ ∈ T¯ (t)
denotes the stopping time choosen by Player 2, who maximizes the expected outcome. In
contrast to the previous consideration here we are only working with non randomized stop-
ping times. Indeed the randomization is in some sense shifted to the additional dynamic p.
Note that the known results in literature do not imply that these games have a value for any
fixed P ∈ P(t, p), i.e.
esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P)t−
= essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P)t−.
(65)
Indeed since p is only assumed to be ca`dla`g the theorems of [18] or [17] requiring basically the
continuity of p do not apply. For us however it is for now not important since our first goal is
an alternative representation of the value function, for which we have a PDE representation.
Since p can be interpreted as a manipulation of the uninformed player by the informed one
the outcome of the game should be some minimum in this manipulation.
Fix t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I). Note that all P ∈ P(t, p) are equal on Ft−, i.e. the
distribution of (Bs,ps) on [0, t) is given by δ(p)⊗ P0, where δ(p) is the measure under which
p is constant and equal to p and P0 is the Wiener measure on Ω0,t. So we can identify each
P ∈ P(t, p) on Ft− with a common probability measure Q and define Q-a.s. the lower value
function
W−(t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P)t− (66)
and the upper value function
W+(t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P)t−, (67)
where by definition we have W−(t, x, p) ≤W+(t, x, p).
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Theorem 6.4. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I) we have that
W (t, x, p) := W+(t, x, p) = W−(t, x, p). (68)
Furthermore the value of the Dynkin game with incomplete information can be written as
V (t, x, p) = W (t, x, p). (69)
To prove the theorem we establish a subdynamic programming for W+ and a superdynamic
programming principle for W−. Then we show that W+ is a subsolution and W− a su-
persolution to the PDE (3.5). After establishing that W+ and W− are bounded, uniformly
continuous functions, which are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p, the comparison result
Theorem 3.7. gives us the equalities (6.5) and (6.6).
6.3 Optimal strategies for the informed player
The motivation for the alternative representation is that, as in [7], [16] it allows to determine
optimal strategies for the informed player. Indeed, if we assume that there exists a P¯ ∈ P(t, p),
such that
V (t, x, p) = essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ, P¯)t−, (70)
then we can define for any scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I} a probability measure P¯i by: for all A ∈ F
we have that
P¯i[A] = P¯[A|pT = ei] = 1
pi
P¯[A ∩ {pT = ei}], if pi > 0,
and P¯i[A] = P¯[A] else. It is clear by Definition 6.1. that B is still a Brownian motion under
Pi.
We note that the right-continuity of p allows to define the stopping time τ∗ = inf{s ∈
[0, T ], (s,Xt,xs ,ps) ∈ D}, where D = {(t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) : V (t, x, p) ≥ 〈h(t, x), p〉}
is a closed set by the continuity of V and g.
The couple (τ∗, P¯i) then defines a randomized stopping time for the first player. Indeed,
for each state of nature i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the informed player stops when (s,Xt,xs ,ps) enters D
under P¯i, where X
t,x is the diffusion both players observe and p under P¯i represents his own
randomization device.
Theorem 6.5. For any scenario i = 1, . . . , I and any stopping time of the uninformed player
σ ∈ T¯ (t) playing (τ∗, P¯i) is optimal for the informed player in the sense that
∑I
i=1 piEP¯i
[
fi(σ,X
t,x
σ )1σ<τ∗ ,σ<T
+hi(τ
∗,Xt,xτ∗ )1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1τ∗=σ=T
]
≤ V (t, x, p).
(71)
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Proof: By definition of P¯i we have
I∑
i=1
piEP¯i
[
fi(σ,X
t,x
σ )1σ<τ∗ ,σ<T + hi(τ
∗,Xt,xτ∗ )1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1τ∗=σ=T
]
=
I∑
i=1
P¯[pT = ei]EP¯
[
fi(σ,X
t,x
σ )1σ<τ∗,σ<T
+hi(τ
∗,Xt,xτ∗ )1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1τ∗=σ=T |pT = ei
]
=
I∑
i=1
EP¯
[
1{pT=ei}
(
fi(σ,X
t,x
σ )1σ<τ∗,σ<T
+hi(τ
∗,Xt,xτ∗ )1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + gi(X
t,x
T )1τ∗=σ=T
)]
=EP¯
[
〈pT , f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ∗ ,σ<T
+〈pT , h(τ∗,Xt,xτ∗ )〉1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1τ∗=σ=T
]
,
while, since p is a martingale, we have by conditioning
EP¯
[
〈pT , f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ∗ ,σ<T
+〈pT , h(τ∗,Xt,xτ∗ )〉1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1τ∗=σ=T
]
= EP¯
[
〈pσ, f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ∗ ,σ<T
+〈pτ∗ , h(τ∗,Xt,xτ∗ )〉1τ∗≤σ,τ∗<T + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1τ∗=σ=T
]
.
(6.8) follows then with (6.7) by standard results.
6.4 The functions W+,W− and ǫ-optimal martingale measures
We conclude this section with some important technical remarks. Note that by its very defi-
nition W+(t, x, p) and W−(t, x, p) are merely Ft− measurable random fields. However we can
show that they are deterministic and hence a good candidate to represent the deterministic
value function V (t, x, p). The proof is mainly based on the methods in [5] using perturbation
of C([0, T ];Rd) with certain elements of the Cameron-Martin space. We already adapted
these arguments to the framework of games with incomplete information in [16]. The proof
is very similar here and thus omitted.
Proposition 6.6. For any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I) we have that
W+(t, x, p) = EQ[W
+(t, x, p)] Q-a.s.
W−(t, x, p) = EQ[W
−(t, x, p)] Q-a.s.
Hence identifying W+, W− respectively with its deterministic version we can consider W+ :
[0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I)→ R and W− : [0, T ) × Rd ×∆(I)→ R as deterministic functions.
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In the following section we establish some regularity results and a dynamic programming
principle. To this end we work with ǫ-optimal measures. Note that since we are taking the
essential infimum over a family of random variables, existence of an ǫ-optimal Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) is
as in [16] not standard. Therefore we provide a technical lemma, the proof of which can be
provided along the lines of [5], [16] respectively.
Lemma 6.7. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) there is an ǫ-optimal Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) in the
sense that Q-a.s.
W−(t, x, p) + ǫ ≥ esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pǫ)t−.
Furthermore for any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I) there is an ǫ-optimal Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) in the
sense that Q-a.s.
W+(t, x, p) + ǫ ≥ essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pǫ)t−.
For technical reasons we furthermore introduce the set Pf (t, p) as the set of all measures
P ∈ P(t, p), such that there exists a finite set S ⊂ ∆(I) with ps ∈ S P-a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
Remark 6.8. Note that for any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I) ǫ > 0 we can choose an ǫ-optimal
Pǫ in the smaller class Pf (t, p). The idea of the proof is as follows: first choose ǫ2 -optimal
measure Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) for W−(t, x, p). Since p progressively measurable we can approximate
it by an elementary processes p¯ǫ, such that one has
|esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pǫ)t− − esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ, P¯ǫ)t−| ≤
ǫ
2
,
where P¯ǫ distribution of (B, p¯ǫ). The same argument works for W+.
7 Dynamic programming for W+,W−
7.1 Regularity properties
Proposition 7.1. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd W+(t, x, p) and W−(t, x, p) are convex in p.
Proof: Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and p1, p2 ∈ ∆(I). Let P1 ∈ P(t, p1), P2 ∈ P(t, p2) be ǫ-
optimal for W+(t, x, p1), W
+(t, x, p2) respectively. For λ ∈ [0, 1] define a martingale measure
Pλ ∈ P(t, pλ), such that for all measurable φ : D([0, T ];∆(I)) × C([0, T ];Rd)→ R+
EPλ[φ(p, B)] = λEP1 [φ(p, B)] + (1− λ)EP2 [φ(p, B)].
Observe that this can be understood as identifying Ω with Ω × {1, 2} with weights λ and
(1− λ) for Ω× {1} and Ω× {2}, respectively. So
W+(t, x, pλ) ≤ essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pλ)t−
= 1Ω×{1}essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P
1)t−
+1Ω×{2}essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,P
2)t−
≤ 1Ω×{1}W+(t, x, p1) + 1Ω×{2}W+(t, x, p2) + 2ǫ
and the convexity follows by taking expectation, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. The
proof for W− follows by similar arguments.
Proposition 7.2. W+(t, x, p) and W−(t, x, p) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and
p and Ho¨lder continuous in t.
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Proof: The proof of Lipschitz continuity in x is straightforward, while the Ho¨lder continuity
in t can be shown as in Proposition 4.1. and Proposition 4.6. in [16].
It remains to prove the uniform Lipschitz continuity in p. Since we have convexity in p, it
is sufficient to establish the Lipschitz continuity with respect to p on the extreme points ei.
Observe that P(t, ei) consists in the single probability measure δ(ei)⊗ P0, where δ(ei) is the
measure under which p is constant and equal to ei and P0 is a Wiener measure.
AssumeW+(t, x, ei)−W+(t, x, p) > 0. For ǫ > 0 let Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W+(t, x, p).
Then
W+(t, x, ei)−W+(t, x, p)− 3ǫ
≤ essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ, δ(ei)⊗ P0)t−
−essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pǫ)t− − 2ǫ.
(72)
Choose now τ¯ ∈ T¯ (t) to be ǫ-optimal for essinfτ∈T¯ (t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ, σ,Pǫ)t− and σ¯ ∈
T¯ (t) to be ǫ-optimal for esssupσ∈T¯ (t)J(t, x, τ¯ , σ, , δ(ei)⊗ P0))t−. Then we have with (7.1)
W+(t, x, ei)−W+(t, x, p)− 3ǫ
≤ EPǫ
[
〈ei − pσ¯, f(σ¯,Xt,xσ¯ )〉1σ¯<τ¯≤T + 〈ei − pτ¯ , h(τ¯ , Xt,xτ¯ )〉1τ¯≤σ¯,τ¯<T
+〈ei − pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σ¯=τ¯=T |Ft−
]
.
(73)
Since for all p ∈ ∆(I) 0 ≤ |p− ei| ≤ c(1− pi) we have by the boundedness of the coefficients
with (7.2) and the fact that p is a Pǫ-martingale with mean p
W+(t, x, ei)−W+(t, x, p)− 3ǫ
≤ c (1− EPǫ [(pσ¯)i1σ¯<τ¯≤T + (pτ¯ )i1τ¯≤σ¯,τ¯<T + (pT )i1σ¯=τ¯=T |Ft−])
≤ c(1− pi).
Using now
1− pi ≤ c
∑
j
|(p)j − δij | ≤ c
√
I|p− ei|,
the claim follows since ǫ can be chosen arbirarily small. The caseW+(t, x, p)−W+(t, x, ei) > 0
is immediate.
The Lipschitz continuity of W− in p can be established by similar arguments.
7.2 Subdynamic programming for W+
Theorem 7.3. Let (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I). Then for all t ∈ [t¯, T ]
W+(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ essinfP∈P(t¯,p¯)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EP
[
〈pσ, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )1σ<τ,σ<t〉
+〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )1τ≤σ,τ<t〉+W+(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τ=σ=t|Ft¯−
]
.
(74)
Proof: Let P ∈ Pf (t, p), t ∈ [t¯, T ]. By assumption there exist S = {p1, . . . , pk}, such
that P[pt− ∈ S] = 1. Furthermore let (Al)l∈N be a partition of Rd by Borel sets, such that
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diam(Al) ≤ ǫ¯ and choose for any l ∈ N some yl ∈ Al.
Define for any l,m measures Pl,m ∈ Pf (t, pm), such that they are ǫ-optimal for W+(t, pm, yl)
and ǫ-optimal stopping times τ l,m. We define the probablility measure Pǫ, such that on
Ω = Ω0,t × Ωt
Pǫ = (P|Ω0,t)⊗ Pˆ, (75)
where for all A ∈ B(Ωt):
Pˆ[A] =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
P[X t¯,x¯t ∈ Al,pt− = pm]Pl,m[A],
and the stopping time
τˆ =
{
τ on {τ < t}
τ l,m on {τ¯ ≥ t,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Al,pt− = pm}.
(76)
Note that by definition (Bs)s∈[t¯,T ] is a Brownian motion under P
ǫ. Also (ps)s∈[t¯,T ] is a
martingale, since for t ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T
EPǫ [ps|Fr] =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,xt ∈Al,pt−=pm}
EPl,m[ps|Fr] =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1
{X t¯,x¯t ∈A
l,pt−=pm}
pr = pr.
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 6.1. are obviously met, hence Pǫ ∈
Pf (t, p). By the definition of W+ we have
W+(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯)EPǫ
[
〈pσ, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )〉1σ<τˆ ,σ<T + 〈pτˆ , h(τˆ , X t¯,x¯τˆ )〉1τˆ≤σ,τˆ<T
+〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σ=τˆ=T |Ft−
]
.
(77)
Note that using the Lipschitz continuity of W+ we have for any σ ∈ T¯ (t¯)
EPǫ
[
〈pσ , f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )〉1t≤σ<τˆ ,σ<T + 〈pτˆ , h(τˆ , X t¯,x¯τˆ )〉1t≤τˆ≤σ,τˆ<T + 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft−
]
≤ EPǫ
[
W+(t, yl, pm)1
{X t¯,x¯t ∈A
l,pt−=pm}
1{σ≥t,τˆ≥t}|Ft−
]
+ cδ + 2ǫ
≤ EPǫ
[
W+(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1{σ≥t,τˆ≥t}|Ft−
]
+ 2cδ + 2ǫ.
Hence we have with (7.6)
W+(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EPǫ
[
〈pσ, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )〉1σ<τ,σ<t + 〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<t
+W+(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1{σ=τ=t}|Ft−
]
+ 2cδ + 2ǫ.
Now choosing P, τ ∈ T¯ (t¯, t) such that they are ǫ optimal for the right hand side of (7.3) gives
the desired result.
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7.3 Superdynamic programming for W−
Theorem 7.4. Let (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I). Then for all t ∈ [t¯, T ]
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ essinfP∈P(t¯,p¯)esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EP
[
〈pσ, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )〉1σ<τ,σ<t
+〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )1τ≤σ,τ<t〉+W−(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τ=σ=t|Ft¯−
]
.
(78)
Proof: We choose a Pǫ ∈ Pf (t¯, p¯) to be ǫ-optimal for W−(t¯, x¯, p¯),
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ essupσ∈T¯ (t¯)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯)EPǫ
[
〈pσ , f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ,σ<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<T
+〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft¯−
]
− ǫ.
(79)
By assumption there exist S = {p1, . . . , pk}, such that Pǫ[pt− ∈ S] = 1. Furthermore let
(Al)l∈N be a partition of R
d by Borel sets, such that diam(Al) ≤ ǫ¯ and choose for any l ∈ N
some yl ∈ Al.
With the help of Pǫ define Pl,m as
Pl,m = (P0 ⊗ δ(pm))⊗ Pˆl,m, (80)
where δ(pm) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to pm, P0 is a Wiener
measure on Ω0,t and for all A ∈ B(Ωt)
Pˆl,m = Pǫ[pt− = p
m,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Al]Pǫ[A|pt− = pm,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Al].
Furthermore define stopping times σl,m ∈ T¯ (t) which are ǫ-optimal for
esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)EPl,m
[
〈pσ, f(σ,Xt,y
l
σ )〉1σ<τ,σ<T
+〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,y
l
τ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<T + 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft−
]
,
(81)
which implies that for all τ ∈ T¯ (t)
EPl,m
[
〈pσl,m , f(σl,m,Xt,y
l
σl,m
)〉1σl,m<τ,σl,m<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )〉1τ≤σl,m,τ<T
+〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σl,m=τ=T |Ft−
]
≥ esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)EPl,m
[
〈pσ , f(σ,Xt,y
l
σ )〉1σ<τ,σ<T
+〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,y
l
τ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<T + 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft−
]
− ǫ
(82)
and
EPl,m
[
〈pσl,m , f(σl,m,Xt,y
l
σl,m
)〉1σl,m<τ,σl,m<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )〉1τ≤σl,m,τ<T
+〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σl,m=τ=T |Ft−
]
≥ essinfP∈P(t,pm)esssupσ∈T¯ (t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t)EP
[
〈pσ , f(σ,Xt,y
l
σ )〉1σ<τ,σ<T
+〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,y
l
τ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<T + 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σ=τ=T |Ft−
]
− ǫ
= W−(t, pm, yl)− ǫ.
(83)
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For any σ ∈ T¯ (t¯) define
σˆ =
{
σ on {σ < t}
σl,m on {σ ≥ t,X t¯,x¯t ∈ Al,pt− = pm}.
(84)
Note that using the Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients and W− and the definition of σˆ
and Pl,m we have for any τ ∈ T¯ (t¯)
EPǫ
[
〈pσˆ , f(σˆ,Xt,xσˆ )〉1t≤σˆ<τ,σˆ<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1t≤τ≤σˆ,τ<T
+〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σˆ=τ=T,σˆ,τ≥t|Ft¯−
]
= EPǫ
[
EPǫ
[
〈pσˆ, f(σˆ,Xt,xσˆ )〉1t≤σˆ<τ,σˆ<T + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1t≤τ≤σˆ,τ<T
+〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉1σˆ=τ=T,σˆ,τ≥t|Ft−
]
|Ft¯−
]
≥ EPǫ
[
1
σ,τ≥t,X t¯,x¯t ∈A
l,pt−=pm
EPl,m
[
〈pσl,m , f(σl,m,Xt,y
l
σl,m
)〉1σl,m<τ,σl,m<T
+〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )〉1τ≤σl,m,τ<T + 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉1σl,m=τ=T |Ft−
]
|Ft¯−
]
−cδ
≥ EPǫ
[
1
σ,τ≥t,X t¯,x¯t ∈A
l,pt−=pm
W (t, yl, pm)|Ft¯−
]
− cδ − ǫ
≥ EPǫ
[
1σ,τ≥tW (t,X
t¯,x¯
t ,pt−)|Ft¯−
]
− 2cδ − ǫ.
This gives with (7.12) for any σ ∈ T¯ (t¯, t)
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EPǫ
[
〈pσ , f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ,σ<t + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<t
+W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1σ=τ=t|Ft¯−
]
− 2cδ − ǫ.
(85)
So in particular when choosing σ¯ ǫ-optimal for
esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EPǫ
[
〈pσ, f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ,σ<t
+〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<t +W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1σ=τ=t|Ft¯−
] (86)
we get
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EPǫ
[
〈pσ, f(σ,Xt,xσ )〉1σ<τ,σ<t + 〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1τ≤σ,τ<t
+〈pτ , h(τ,Xt,xτ )〉1t>σ≥τ +W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1σ=τ=t|Ft¯−
]
− 2cδ − 2ǫ
and the claim follows by taking the essential infimum in P ∈ P(t¯, p¯) since δ and ǫ can be
chosen arbitrarily small.
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8 Viscosity solution property W+,W−
8.1 Subsolution property of W+
Theorem 8.1. W+ is a viscosity subsolution to the obstacle problem
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
w − 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)}
= 0
(87)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i=1,...,I pigi(x).
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I) → R be a test function such that W+ − φ has a strict
global maximum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ) × Rd × Int(∆(I)) with W (t¯, x¯, p¯) − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0. We
have to show, that
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ− 〈f(t, x), p〉},
φ− 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)} ≤ 0 (88)
at (t¯, x¯, p¯).
By Proposition 7.2 W+ is convex in p. So since p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)), we have that
−λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
(t¯, x¯, p¯)
)
≤ 0.
So it remains to show, that
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
−L)[φ], φ − 〈f(t, x), p〉}, φ − 〈h(t, x), p〉} ≤ 0 (89)
at (t¯, x¯, p¯). Note that the subdynamic programming for W+ implies for P = P0 ⊗ δ(p¯) in
particular
W+(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)esssupσ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EP
[
〈p¯, f(σ,X t¯,x¯σ )1σ<τ,σ<t〉
+〈p¯, h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )1τ≤σ,τ<t〉+W+(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)1τ=σ=t|Ft¯−
]
.
So (8.2) follows by the standard arguments we mentioned already in the proof of Theorem
5.1.
8.2 Supersolution property of W−
Theorem 8.2. W− is a viscosity supersolution to the obstacle problem
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
w − 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)}
= 0
(90)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i=1,...,I pigi(x).
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Proof: Let φ : [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) → R be a smooth test function with uniformly bounded
derivatives such that W− − φ has a strict global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ) × Rd × ∆(I)
with W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0. We have to show
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ− 〈f(t, x), p〉},
φ− 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)} ≥ 0 (91)
at (t¯, x¯, p¯). If
λmin
(
p,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
≤ 0
at (t¯, x¯, p¯) (8.5) obviously holds. So we assume in the subsequent steps strict convexity of φ
in p at (t¯, x¯, p¯), i.e. there exist δ, η > 0 such that for all z ∈ T∆(I)(p¯)
〈∂
2φ
∂p2
(t, x, p)z, z〉 > 4δ|z|2 ∀(t, x, p) ∈ Bη(t¯, x¯, p¯). (92)
Since φ is a test function for a purely local viscosity notion, one can modify it outside a
neighborhood of (t¯, x¯, p¯) such that for all (s, x) ∈ [t¯, T ] × Rd the function φ(s, x, ·) is convex
on the whole convex domain ∆(I). Thus for any p ∈ ∆(I) we have that
W−(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯), p− p¯〉. (93)
Step 1: Estimate for p.
As in (4.14) we have with (8.6) a stronger estimate, namely there exist δ, η > 0 such that for
all p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [t¯, t¯+ η], x ∈ Bη(x¯)
W−(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p¯), p − p¯〉+ δ|p − p¯|2. (94)
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1. we can set in the dynamic programming for W− σ = t to
get
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ essinfP∈P(t¯,p¯)essinfτ∈T¯ (t¯,t)EP
[
〈pτ , h(τ,X t¯,x¯τ )1τ<t〉+W−(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τ=t|Ft¯−
]
.
(95)
So for ǫ(t− t¯)-optimal Pǫ ∈ Pf (t, p) and a ǫ(t− t¯)-optimal stopping time τ ǫ we have
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)
≥ EPǫ
[
〈pτǫ , h(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ )〉1τǫ<t +W−(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τǫ=t|Ft¯−
]
− 2ǫ(t− t¯)
= EPǫ
[
〈pτǫ−, h(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ )〉1τǫ<t +W−(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τǫ=t|Ft¯−
]
− 2ǫ(t− t¯)
≥ EPǫ
[
W (τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ ,pτǫ−)|Ft¯−
]
− 2ǫ(t− t¯),
(96)
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since 〈p, h(t, x)〉 ≥ W−(t, x, p) for all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I). Using (8.7) and (8.8) we
get since W−(t¯, x¯, p¯) = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)
0 ≥ EPǫ
[
φ(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ , p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈∂φ∂p (τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ , p¯),pτǫ− − p¯〉
+δ1{|X t¯,x¯−x|<η}|pτǫ− − p¯|
∣∣Ft¯−
]
− 2ǫ(t− t¯).
(97)
Now by Itoˆ’s formula and since the derivatives of φ are uniformly bounded we have that∣∣∣EPǫ [φ(τǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ , p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)∣∣Ft¯−]∣∣∣ ≤ cEPǫ[(τ ǫ − t¯) |Ft¯−] ≤ c(t− t¯). (98)
Next, let f : [t¯, t] × Rn → Rn be a smooth bounded function, with bounded derivatives.
Recall that under any P ∈ Pf (t¯, p¯) the process p is strongly orthogonal to B. So since under
Pǫ the process p is a martingale with EPǫ [pτǫ−|Ft¯−] = p¯, we have by Itoˆ’s formula that
EPǫ
[
fi(τ
ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ )(pτǫ− − p¯)i
∣∣Ft¯−] = EPǫ
[ ∫ τǫ
t¯
(
(
∂
∂t
+ L)fi(s,X t¯,x¯s )
)
(ps − p¯)ids
∣∣Ft¯−
]
.
Hence by the assumption on the coefficients of the diffusion (A)(i)∣∣∣∣EPǫ
[
〈∂φ
∂p
(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ , p¯),pτǫ− − p¯〉
∣∣Ft¯−
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ cEPǫ [(τ ǫ − t¯) |Ft¯−] ≤ c(t− t¯). (99)
Furthermore observe that, since |pτǫ−− p¯| ≤ 1, we have, that for ǫ′ > 0 by Young and Ho¨lder
inequality
EPǫ
[
1
{|X t¯,x¯
τǫ
−x¯|<η}
|pτǫ− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ EPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− 1ηEPǫ [|X t¯,x¯τǫ − x¯||pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ (1− ǫ′
η
)EPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− 14ηǫ′EPǫ [|X t¯,x¯τǫ − x¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ (1− ǫ′
η
)EPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− c4ηǫ′EPǫ [(τ ǫ − t¯) |Ft¯−],
hence
EPǫ
[
1
{|X t¯,x¯
τǫ
−x¯|<η}
|pτǫ− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ (1− ǫ′
η
)EPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− c4ηǫ′ (t− t¯).
(100)
Choosing 0 < ǫ′ < η and combining (8.11) with the estimates (8.12)-(8.14) there exists a
constant c, such that
EPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−] ≤ c(t− t¯). (101)
This implies in particular for h > 0 by Doob’s inequality
Pǫ
[
sup
s∈[t¯,τǫ[
|ps − p¯| > h
]
≤ cEPǫ
[|pτǫ− − p¯|2]
h2
≤ c(t− t¯)
h2
. (102)
Step 2: Viscosity supersolution property
To show the viscosity supersolution property we have to show that
W−(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 = φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 < 0
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implies
(
∂φ
∂t
+ L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ 0.
We will argue by contradiction. Assume that
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)− 〈h(t¯, x¯), p¯〉 < 0 and (∂φ
∂t
+ L)[φ](t¯, x¯, p¯) > 0. (103)
Then there exist h, δ > 0 such that for all (s, x, p) ∈ [t¯, t¯+ h]×B(x¯, p¯)
〈h(s, x), p¯〉 − φ(s, x, p¯) ≥ δ and (∂φ
∂t
+ L)[φ](s, x, p¯) ≥ δ. (104)
By the Itoˆ formula we have, that
φ(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ ,pτǫ) ≥ φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) +
∫ τǫ
t¯
( ∂
∂t
+ L)[φ](s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps)ds, (105)
where we used the fact that by the convexity of φ we have Pǫ-a.s., that
∑
t¯≤r<τǫ
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
≥ 0.
Define A := {infs∈[t¯,t] |ps− − p¯| > h} and B := {infs∈[t¯,t] |X t¯,x¯t − x¯| > h}.
Note that by (8.16) and since Pǫ[B] ≤ c(t−t¯)2
h4
we have that
EPǫ[1A1B ] ≤ c(EPǫ [1A]) 12 (EPǫ [1B ]) 12
≤ c( (t−t¯)
h2
)
1
2 ( (t−t¯)
2
h4
)
1
2 = c (t−t¯)
3
2
h3
.
(106)
Now we can continue as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. By using (8.19) we get
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ EPǫ
[
1Ac1Bc
(
φ(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ ,pτǫ−)−
∫ τǫ
t¯
( ∂
∂t
+ L)[φ](s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps)ds
)]
+c (t−t¯)
3
2
h3
≤ EPǫ
[
〈h(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ ),pτǫ〉1τǫ<t + φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τǫ=t
]
−δEPǫ [1τǫ<t]− δEPǫ [(τ ǫ − t¯)] + 2c (t−t¯)
3
2
h3
.
As in (5.7) we have that for 1 ≥ (t− t¯)
(t− t¯) ≤ EPǫ [1τǫ<t] + EPǫ
[
(τ ǫ − t¯)
∣∣Ft¯−] (107)
so
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ EPǫ
[
〈h(τ ǫ,X t¯,x¯τǫ ),pτǫ〉1τǫ<t + φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)1τǫ=t
]
−δ(t− t¯) + 2c (t−t¯)
3
2
h3
,
which gives with (8.19)
−δ(t− t¯) + 2c(t − t¯)
3
2
h3
+ 2ǫ(t− t¯) ≥ 0.
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Dividing by (t− t¯) we have
− δ + 2c(t− t¯)
1
2
h3
+ 2ǫ ≥ 0. (108)
However (8.22) contradicts δ > 0, since ǫ and t− t¯ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
The proof of Theorem 6.4 is now straightforward using the subsolution property of W+, the
supersolution property of W− and the comparison result of Theorem 3.7.
9 Appendix: Comparison
In this section we provide the proof of the comparison result Theorem 3.7. for the fully non
linear variational PDE (3.5)
max
{
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − 〈f(t, x), p〉},
w − 〈h(t, x), p〉},−λmin
(
p, ∂
2w
∂p2
)}
= 0
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i=1,...,I pigi(x). The proof is more or less a straight
forward adaption of the results in [6].
9.1 Reduction to the faces
Let I˜ ⊂ {1, . . . , I} and we define the set ∆(I˜) by
∆(I˜) = {p ∈ ∆(I) : pi = 0 if i 6∈ I˜}. (109)
Note that by Definition 3.3. the supersolution property is obviously preserved under restric-
tion. We just state
Proposition 9.1. Let w : [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I)→ R be a bounded, continuous viscosity super-
solution to (3.5), which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p. Then the restriction of w to
∆(I˜) is a supersolution to (3.5) on [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I˜).
The subsolution property is however not immediate, since Int(∆(I˜)) 6⊆ Int(∆(I)).
Proposition 9.2. Let w : [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I) → R be a bounded, continuous viscosity sub-
solution to (3.5), which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p. Then the restriction of w to
∆(I˜) is a subsolution to (3.5) on [0, T ] ×Rd ×∆(I˜).
Proof: Set w˜ = w
∣∣
∆(I˜)
. Let (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ (0, T )×Rd× Int(∆(I˜)) and φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I˜)→ R
a test function such that w˜−φ has a strict minimum at (t¯, x¯, p˜) with w˜(t¯, x¯, p˜)−φ(t¯, x¯, p˜) = 0.
By using the viscosity subsolution property of w on [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I) we have to show:
(i) λmin
(
p˜, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)
≥ 0
(ii)
max{min{(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φ], φ − 〈f(t, x), p〉}, φ − 〈h(t, x), p〉} ≤ 0
at (t¯, x¯, p˜).
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However p˜ 6∈ Int(∆(I)) so we have to use an appropriate approximation. Let µ ∈ RI such
that µi = 0 if i ∈ I˜ and µi = 1 else. Furthermore we define for p ∈ ∆(I) the projection Π
onto ∆(I˜) by
Π(p)i =
{
pi +
(∑
j 6∈I˜ pi
)
/|I˜ | if i ∈ I˜,
0 else.
Since w is uniformly Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant k with respect to p, we
have
w(t, x, p) ≤ w˜(t, x,Π(p)) + (k + 1)|Π(p) − p|
with an equality for p ∈ ∆(I˜), hence
w(t, x, p) ≤ φ(t, x,Π(p)) + 2(k + 1)〈µ, p〉
with an equality only at (t¯, x¯, p˜), where we used
|Π(p)− p| ≤
∑
j∈I˜
|Π(p)j − pj |+
∑
j 6∈I˜
pj = (1 + 1/|I˜ |)
∑
j 6∈I˜
pj = 2〈µ, p〉.
For ǫ > 0 small we now consider
max
(t,x,p)∈[0,T ]×Rd×∆(I)
w(t, x, p) − φǫ(t, x, p) (110)
with
φǫ(t, x, p) = φ(t, x,Π(p)) + 2(k + 1)〈µ, p〉 − ǫσ(p)
and σ(p) =
∑
j 6∈I˜ ln(pi(1 − pi)). For ǫ sufficiently small this problem has a maximum
(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ) which converges to (t¯, x¯, p˜) as ǫ ↓ 0. By the definition of σ and the fact that
p˜ ∈ Int(∆(I˜)) we have that pǫ ∈ Int(∆(I)). Hence by the subsolution property of w we have,
that λmin
(
pǫ,
∂2φǫ
∂p2
)
(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ) ≥ 0. Note that since Π is affine, Π|∆(I˜) = id and σ does not
depend on pi for i ∈ I˜, we have
lim infǫ↓0 λmin
(
pǫ,
∂2φǫ
∂p2
)
(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ)
≤ lim infǫ↓0minz∈T∆(I˜)(p˜)\{0}
〈∂2φǫ(tǫ,xǫ,pǫ)z,z〉
|z|2
≤ lim infǫ↓0minz∈T∆(I˜)(p˜)\{0}
〈∂2φǫ(tǫ,xǫ,Π(pǫ))z,z〉
|z|2
= λmin
(
p˜, ∂
2φ
∂p2
)
(t¯, x¯, p˜).
And since λmin
(
pǫ,
∂2φǫ
∂p2
)
(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ) ≥ 0, we have
λmin
(
p˜,
∂2φ
∂p2
)
(t¯, x¯, p˜) ≥ 0. (111)
(ii) follows then by the subsolution property of w, i.e.
max
{
min
{
(− ∂
∂t
− L)[φǫ](tǫ, xǫ, pǫ)),
φ(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ)− 〈f(tǫ, xǫ), pǫ〉
}
, φ(tǫ, xǫ, pǫ)− 〈h(tǫ, xǫ), pǫ〉
} ≤ 0 (112)
by letting ǫ ↓ 0.
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9.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Let w1 : [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I) → R be a bounded, continuous viscosity subsolution to (3.5),
which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p, and w2 : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R be a bounded,
continuous viscosity supersolution to (3.5), which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p.
Assume that
w1(T, x, p) ≤ w2(T, x, p) (113)
for all x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I). We want to show that
w1(t, x, p) ≤ w2(t, x, p) (114)
for all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×∆(I). As in [6] we prove (9.6) by induction over I. Indeed if
I = 1, (3.5) reduces to
max
{
min
{
(− ∂
∂t
− L)[w], w − f1(t, x)
}
, w − h1(t, x)
}
= 0, (115)
where comparison is a classical result, see e.g. [17]. Assume that Theorem 3.7. holds for
I ∈ N∗. That means for w1, w2 : [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I + 1) we have by Proposition 9.1. and 9.2.
that
w1(t, x, p) ≤ w2(t, x, p) ∀(t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × ∂(∆(I)). (116)
We will show (9.6) by contradiction. Assume
M := sup
(t,x,p)∈[0,T ]×Rd×∆(I))
(w1 −w2) > 0. (117)
Since w1 and w2 are bounded we have for ǫ, α, η > 0 that
Mǫ,α,η := max(t,s,x,y,p)∈[0,T ]2×R2d×∆(I)
{
w1(t, x, p)− w2(s, y, p)
− |t−s|2+|x−y|22ǫ − α2 (|x|2 + |y|2) + ηt
} (118)
is finite and achieved at a point (t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯, p¯) (dependent on ǫ, α, η). Furthermore we have for
the limit
lim
ǫ,α,η↓0
Mǫ,α,η = sup
(t,x,p)∈[0,T ]×Rd×∆(I))
(w1 − w2) = M > 0. (119)
With (9.5) and the Ho¨lder continuity of w1 and w2 we have with (9.11) that t¯, s¯ < T for
ǫ, α, η small enough. Also note that p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)) as soon as Mǫ,α,η > 0.
We now consider a new penalization: For β, δ > 0 small
Mǫ,α,η,δ,β := max(t,s,x,y,p,q)∈[0,T ]2×R2d×∆(I)2
{
w1(t, x, p)− w2(s, y, p)
− |t−s|2+|x−y|22ǫ − |p−q|2δ − α2 (|x|2 + |y|2) + ηt+ β2 (|p|2 + |q|2)
} (120)
is attained at a point (t˜, s˜, x˜, y˜, p˜, q˜) (dependent on ǫ, α, η, δ, β), where
|t˜− s˜|2 + |x˜− y˜|2
2ǫ
,
|p˜− q˜|
2δ
, α|x˜|2, α|y˜|2, β|p˜|2, β|q˜|2 ≤ 2(|w1|∞ + |w2|∞). (121)
Furthermore we have with (9.11)
w1(t˜, x˜, p˜)−w2(s˜, y˜, q˜) > 0. (122)
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So for β, δ ↓ 0 (t˜, s˜, x˜, y˜, p˜, q˜) converges (up to subsequences) to some (t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯, p¯, p¯), where
(t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯, p¯) is a maximum point of (9.12). Hence for β, δ sufficiently small we have that
p˜, q˜ ∈ Int(∆(I)).
From the usual maximum principle (see e.g. [9]) we have that:
for all σ ∈ (0, 1) there exist X1,X2 ∈ Sd, P1, P2 ∈ SI such that on [0, T ]2 × R2d × TI with
TI = {z ∈ RI :
∑
i zi = 0} we have(
t˜− s˜
ǫ
− η, x˜− y˜
ǫ
+ αx˜,
p˜− q˜
δ
− βp˜, X1, P1|TI )
)
∈ D¯1,2,2,−w1(t˜, x˜, p˜)
and (
t˜− s˜
ǫ
,
x˜− y˜
ǫ
− αy˜, p˜− q˜
δ
+ βq˜, X2, P2|TI
)
∈ D¯1,2,2,+w2(s˜, y˜, q˜)
with
diag
((
X1 0
0 −X2
)
,
(
P1|TI 0
0 −P2|TI
))
≤ A+ σA2,
where
A = diag
{
1
ǫ
(
idd −idd
−idd idd
)
+ αid2d,
1
δ
(
idI −idI
−idI idI
)
− βid2I
}
.
Note that (
X1 0
0 −X2
)
≤
(
1
ǫ
+ 2
σ
ǫ2
+ 2
ασ
ǫ
)(
idd −idd
−idd idd
)
+ (α+ α2σ)id2d (123)
and
(P1 − P2)|TI ≤ (−β + σβ2)id2I . (124)
Since w1 is a viscosity subsolution to (3.5) we have
λmin(p˜, P1) ≥ 0. (125)
And since p˜ ∈ Int(∆(I)), this yields with (9.16) to
λmin(q˜, P2) > 0. (126)
Furthermore since w1 is a viscosity subsolution and w2 is a viscosity supersolution we have
w1(t˜, x˜, p˜) ≤ 〈h(t˜, x˜), p˜〉
w2(s˜, y˜, q˜) ≥ 〈f(s˜, y˜), q˜〉,
(127)
which yields for ǫ, α, η, δ, β small enough with (9.11)
w1(t˜, x˜, p˜) > 〈f(t˜, x˜), p˜〉
w2(s˜, y˜, q˜) < 〈h(s˜, y˜), q˜〉.
(128)
So again using the subsolution property of w1 and the supersolution property of w2 we have
with (9.20)
t˜−s˜
ǫ
− η + 12tr(aa∗(t˜, x˜)X1) + b(t˜, x˜)
(
x˜−y˜
ǫ
+ αx˜
)
≥ 0
t˜−s˜
ǫ
+ 12tr(aa
∗(s˜, y˜)X2) + b(t˜, x˜)
(
x˜−y˜
ǫ
− αy˜
)
≤ 0.
(129)
Now using (9.15) and (9.16) in (9.21) yields a contradiction for ǫ, α, η sufficiently small as in
the standard case (see [9]).
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